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Abstract 
We must understand neoliberalism as a distinct form of government with political, 
economic and cultural components.  In this paper, neoliberalism is defined in terms of 
the work of the Ordoliberalen and of the Chicago School.  It is suggested that a 
definition of neoliberalism must dwell less the prioritisation of the market and the 
definition of all human activity in terms of economic criteria; it is more important to 
consider the degree of naturalness or artificiality of society, and the role of 
government in the generation and protection of society.  It is suggested that as an 
economic practice, neoliberalism is not especially innovative, yet as a political 
practice, it is extremely inventive. 
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Introductory Remarks 
The main task of this paper is to identify some prime features of neoliberalism, a 
rather hackneyed and imprecise term in sociology and in many other cognate 
disciplines.  Accordingly, we proceed as follows.  First of all, we define liberalism, 
and begin to distinguish it as a discrete political practice.  Second, we move on to a 
discussion of neo-liberalism, with an emphasis on its discontinuities with liberalism.  
To better understand neoliberalism and to appreciate its political inventiveness, we 
dwell on two key sources of neoliberal thought – the Ordoliberalen and the Chicago 
School.  Hayek is discussed in terms of his finessing of neoliberal thought.  A new 
understanding of the market and a concurrent new understanding of the rational actor 
emerge from these scholars. 
 
To begin our definitional task, if we think in terms of historical periodization, we may 
say that after the Second World War, liberalism took a new turn.  This had two major 
temporal phases.  The first phase is sometimes described as ‘welfarism’ (see, for 
example, Rose, 1993), in which many advanced liberal democracies followed what 
might be termed a ‘Keynesian’ path, engaging in a variety of social insurance 
measures while following a ‘mixed economy’ strategy.  We need to distinguish the 
various levels of welfare support offered throughout the world. In Europe, for 
example, Giddens (1998: 6-7) makes a useful distinction between the UK model, 
which emphasized social services and health; the Scandinavian model, which provided 
higher benefits from a higher tax base; the middle European models, which had a low 
commitment to social services, but well-funded benefits in other areas; and the 
southern European systems, which were similar to the middle European, but less 
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comprehensive and with lower levels of support.   The second phase emerged roughly 
in the 1970s, and is characterized by ‘economic rationalism’, the disposal of publicly 
owned national industries to the private sector (‘privatization’), the rolling back of the 
welfare state, the introduction of market-style competition into a range of arenas 
previously uncontaminated by such an ethos, and enforced state-sponsored inspection 
of zones such as education and health (which had previously been granted a greater 
degree of professional autonomy).  This second phase is what we term ‘neoliberalism’; 
however, we should be aware that is common in the literature to distinguish these 
forms of liberalism by ‘sphere’, such as ‘economic neoliberalism’, ‘social 
neoliberalism’, ‘political neoliberalism’, and so forth. 
 
We can also make a second type of definition in terms of the relationship different 
forms of liberalism have to the character of society.  Burchell (1996) has usefully 
described this turn as away from classical liberalism’s conceptualization of society as 
‘natural’ (Adam Smith, in this context, spoke of the ‘natural system of liberty’), 
towards the neoliberal understanding of the social sphere as one that needs to be 
actively constructed by government.  The locus classicus is Hayek (1979), who 
describes society as an ‘artefact’.  In classical liberalism, civil society can be seen as a 
kind of resource for the invigoration of the state; consequently, the themes of the 
separation of state and civil society and the importance of a laissez-faire approach to 
economy and civil society are enormously important in eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century liberal political philosophy.  The discovery of ‘population’ and ‘the 
social’ is a fundamental moment in the birth of liberalism, but we need to stress that 
the social under classical liberalism is seen as spontaneous or naturally self-
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reproducing.  There is a long and continuing history to this idea of the naturalness of 
social relations.  A crucial early resource in political philosophy is Hobbes, who 
distinguishes a natural (although brutish) civil society that the state can and must 
regulate.  The young Marx, of course, generated a new morally-charged version of this 
idea in arguing that a virtuous natural civil society was endangered by a parasitic, 
artificial state.  More recently, Habermas (1987) has distinguished between system and 
lifeworld, the latter being the natural site of everyday relations.  Further, Habermas 
suggests that we need to protect the natural virtues of the lifeworld, which are in 
danger of being strangled by the bureaucratic, artificial system.  It is worth remarking 
that in this regard – in its recharacterization of what is natural and what is constructed 
- neoliberalism is remarkably innovative: it is rarely given appropriate credit for its 
political inventiveness. 
 
The neoliberal turn understands government as the active constitution of the 
conditions under which civil society might flourish.  The conditions include both the 
introduction of market forces and the attachment of performance targets in social areas 
such health, education, and so forth, and the associated requirements that individuals 
take responsibility for their own lives (rather than becoming dependent on state 
distribution).  Interestingly, this emphasis on the need to constitute society artificially 
can potentially lead to the idea, most famously enunciated by Margaret Thatcher 
(1987; 1993: 620), that there is no such thing as society.  Of course, what Thatcher 
meant was that there should be no such thing as a dependent, ‘welfare’ society.  She 
did not resile from the governmental invention and imposition of frameworks that 
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would allow individuals and families to constitute the most auspicious social 
conditions for themselves.  
 
To a certain extent the philosophical differences between liberalism and neoliberalism 
are slight: it is certainly the case that all the elements of neoliberalism are contained 
within liberalism – responsibility, self-government, private rather than public 
ownership, an essentialization of the market, the attention to practices of freedom of 
the individual, and so forth.  It might be accurate to say that it has only been because 
of socialist and social-democratic versions of liberalism that such notions as ‘the 
welfare state’ became embedded in liberal politics at all (certainly the Ordoliberalen  
regarded macroeconomic Keynesianism as illiberal, to the extent that it failed to 
understand market pricing mechanisms and intervened in fiscal and monetary matters 
to the detriment of society).  Neoliberalism, then, at one level, is an emphasis on 
certain well-established liberal themes.  However, as a political practice, neoliberalism 
is distinctive: in the neoliberal political landscape of the 1970s and 1980s, especially 
in the policy directions of the Reagan and the Thatcher administrations in the US and 
the UK respectively, but also in Australia and New Zealand, there were stringent 
attempts to remove the ‘nanny’ state, to put an end to a perceived culture of welfare 
dependence, and to reinvigorate the nation by giving free rein to individuals’ own 
entrepreneurial proclivities.  While there is an element of reducing the state, what is 
fundamental to these efforts is that a more authoritative state must now concentrate on 
providing the conditions under which individual entrepreneurship, self-government, 
freedom and responsibility can be possible.   
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In terms of trying to define the differences between liberalism and neoliberalism, then, 
we have seen that liberalism, as a doctrine of permanent self-critique, is always likely 
to generate new governmental rationalities.  However, in common parlance, the term 
neoliberalism is most closely associated with the models of the last thirty years, which 
focus on a new and reduced role for government as a ‘condition provider’, and argue 
that government must take a back seat to market forces.  In these models, we see the 
old paradox of liberalism, in that it has an overt philosophy of social non-intervention, 
yet it cannot bear to leave civil society alone. Indeed, despite philosophies of 
‘deregulation’, considerable state intervention and reregulation has occurred, not least 
in the UK (Moran, 2003). 
 
The Ordoliberalen and the Chicago School 
The German Ordoliberalen (so-called because of their association with the journal 
Ordo) generated a series of novel propositions that proved vital in the regeneration of 
liberalism.  These thinkers, mostly jurists and economists, were working from the 
1920s in Germany, but were mostly in exile under Hitler’s rule.  Returning to 
Germany at the end of the War, they played a major part in the rebuilding of West 
Germany.  In essence, they suggested that a variety of failures of liberalism – 
including the Depression and the Third Reich – were a result of the lack of the 
appropriate cultural, legal and social frameworks that would guarantee the correct 
working of the market.  The Ordoliberalen were far removed from Adam Smith’s 
natural system of liberty: for them, the market was understood as an artificial game of 
competitive liberty.  This game was not to be guaranteed by market intervention, but 
by intervention into the vital conditions for the market-game: the rule of law, the 
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surrounding culture, the institutional frameworks, and so forth.  While they saw an 
analogy between the necessary competitiveness of the market and of social and 
cultural life (the latter should emulate the former), they nonetheless advocated policies 
of social assistance.  As Gordon (1991: 42) summarizes, ‘the major problem of social 
politics… is not the anti-social effects of the economic market, but the anti-
competitive effects of society’.  Juridical and institutional interventionism was the 
order (pun intended) of the day, an interventionism that, it was hoped, would suffuse 
society with the appropriate competitive spirit: this, Rüstow (1980) calls Vitalpolitik. 
He [sc. Rüstow] proposes that the whole ensemble of 
individual life be structured as the pursuit of a range of 
different enterprises: a person’s relation to his or her self, 
his or her professional activity, family, personal property, 
environment, etc., are all to be given the ethos and 
structure of the enterprise-form.  This ‘vital policy’ will 
foster a process of ‘creation of ethical and cultural values’ 
within society (Gordon 1991: 42). 
 
This emerging philosophy has many of the elements of what we now recognize as 
neoliberalism.  To the modern sensibility, it is perhaps jarring to see a mixture of 
market-led policies and social insurance: but this should serve to remind us that 
‘purer’ forms of neoliberalism have never quite purged themselves of social 
government, and that there is a direct line of descent between the Ordoliberalen and 
the ‘There is no alternative’ (TINA) neoliberalism of Margaret Thatcher and Keith 
Joseph, and the rest. 
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 The Chicago School theorists, the most prominent of whom was Gary C. Becker (see, 
for example, Becker, 1964; 1976), took a more radical approach to the relationship of 
the market and the social.  While the Ordoliberalen aimed to govern the social to 
preserve and strengthen the economic, the Chicago neoliberals, who established a 
number of strong links with their German colleagues, proposed that the social become 
a form of the economic.  While the Ordoliberalen regarded the market as a rather 
fragile entity, for the Chicago economists, by contrast, the market was so robust that 
its rationality could be extended to the social – including crime, family life, work life, 
and so forth.  The Chicago economists’ work can be seen as a reaction to the 
‘overgovernment’ of the New Deal and the US wartime economy, but it was also 
profoundly influenced by the behaviourism that was in vogue in the US in the social 
sciences of the 1950s and 1960s.  The starting point for their radical 
reconceptualization of the social lay in the idea that all rational behaviour is about 
deciding which resources are best devoted to which ends.  Once all rational human 
behaviour has been understood as economic behaviour, then, government becomes 
nothing more or less than economic government. 
 
The rational economic actor’s choice is his/her defining characteristic, allowing homo 
economicus to supplant the theorizations of ‘man’ that had been developed in 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, criminology, and so on.  As Gordon (1991: 43) 
makes clear, this is a reactivation of the Scottish Enlightenment’s economic agent; yet 
it is also a rewriting of what Adam Smith and his like-minded theorists had in mind, 
since the behaviourist element in the Chicago characterisation allows homo 
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economicus to be manipulable – ‘perpetually responsive to modifications in his 
environment’ (ibid.).  In addition, Becker and his colleagues construct the notion of 
entrepreneurship as a model for the permanent project of self-development, a notion 
which is crucial for later neoliberalism.  The Chicago School suggested that the 
individual needed to conceptualize his or her skills and aptitudes in the language of the 
market, as human capital, which can be put to work to earn revenue (wages).  A skill 
or aptitude is a ‘quasi-machine for the production of a value’ (Gordon 1991: 44), while 
activities such as education come to be understood as investment in the (long-term 
project of the) self.  Life, for the Chicago School, is an enterprise. 
 
This latter notion has clearly been vital in contemporary neoliberal politics, as the 
emphasis has shifted away from Keynesian safety-net provision to individual 
responsibility for one’s own life projects.  For example, in governmental interventions 
into education, we have seen the stimulation of ‘lifelong learning’ (it is no longer 
acceptable to imagine one is finished with education).  Meanwhile, in health 
provision, the move towards private health cover has been associated with an 
educative function that stresses self-management and preventative health practices.  
Even at the level of popular culture, as any frequenter of airport bookshops will attest, 
the notions of self-help and self-development have made fortunes for a huge number 
of lifestyle gurus who have outlined the magnificent possibilities for the individual 
who ‘takes control’ (and, once again, it seems impossible – or culturally idiosyncratic 
- to argue that one does not want to be developed). 
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For neoliberals, this notion of life as a project solves the problem of the possible 
descent of economic man into selfishness, greed, and acquisition for its own sake; a 
solution just as neat as the one Weber identified for his proto-capitalist protestants.  As 
Gordon argues, this right to permanent retraining has become enshrined in neoliberal 
inspired legislation, but has usually been played out via a  
technical content [which] has relied heavily on the 
contributions of the ‘new psychological culture’, that 
cornucopia of techniques of the self which symbiotize 
aptitude with self-awareness and performance with self-
realization (not to mention self-presentation).  What some 
cultural critics diagnose as the triumph of auto-consuming 
narcissism can perhaps be more adequately understood as a 
part of the managerialization of personal identity and personal 
relations which accompanies the capitalization of the meaning 
of life (Gordon 1991: 44). 
 
We have dwelt a while on these early moves in neoliberalism, since they enunciate 
some of the fundamentals of its later ethos and practice.  First, they establish the 
artificiality of the social; second, they understand the market as the source of liberty, 
and a true description (in the case of the Chicago School) of other areas of life, 
especially the social; third, they stress the importance of the manipulation of the 
frameworks (Ordoliberalen) or the stimuli (Chicago School) that surround the market; 
finally, they construct a new notion of self, in which actors can be seen as 
fundamentally economic, while their aptitudes and skills can be understood as human 
 
capital.  As for the state: it has moved from being ‘social’ to being ‘enabling’ (Rose 
1999: 142). 
 
Hayek 
In his 1944 book, The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich von Hayek launched his highly 
influential critique of state intervention. Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union 
were pilloried as examples of whither excessive state control could lead.  In addition, 
however, other somewhat milder versions of liberal interventionism – especially 
Keynesianism – were attacked.  Hayek’s notion of freedom is important here: it is 
somewhat different to that presented in the works of the Ordoliberalen, in that 
freedom is an artefact of civilization.  Within Hayek’s framework, there are three 
‘levels’, nature, culture and reason, and it is within the second of these that freedom is 
to be found.  The three levels are built upon each other, and concern the realm of 
instincts, the realm of civilization that tamed nature, and the world of abstract rules 
such as the law.  In this conceptualization, civilization is a precondition for reason, 
and, as we have seen, for freedom.  Freedom for Hayek is a matter of the submission 
of the individual to discipline, and to this extent he echoes Hobbes.  As Dean (1999: 
157) points out, Hayek’s negative (freedom is freedom from the will of others) and 
anti-naturalist position on freedom brings him into conflict with his Ordoliberalen 
compatriots and their ‘constructivist’ approach to the origins of freedom.  Hayek 
(1976: 17) suggests that this erroneous approach has its beginnings in utilitarianism.  
Finally, freedom has a role to play in the future of civilization: although it is a product 
of civilization, freedom is at the same time the condition of civilization’s evolution.  In 
stressing this role for freedom, Hayek is keen to downplay the possibility that any kind 
 12
of cultural evolution is possible through central (governmental) planning.  This 
critique promotes the possibilities of freedom in an individualistic culture as against 
the proven failures of Soviet command economies and Nazi authoritarianism. 
 
As for the market, again Hayek is subtly different from other neoliberal theorists.  The 
market is not understood as a natural phenomenon, but nor is it the result of a 
contrived governmental policy.  It is rather something like a ‘spontaneous social order’ 
(Dean 1999: 157), arrived at through the rules of conduct established in cultural 
evolution.  While there may be a need for a conditioning of the market’s social and 
political framework, the market itself is ‘culture’ rather than ‘reason’, and thus is not 
sensibly regulated at the level of government. 
 
Conclusion 
To understand neoliberalism, it is necessary to understand how the economic doctrines 
of the Ordoliberalen and the Chicago School allowed the development of a political 
and cultural neoliberalism.  It is also necessary to come to terms with how Hayek’s 
work on culture provided neoliberalism with a rich but extremely practical approach to 
the recalculation and reprogramming of government.  A more precise understanding of 
the conditions of emergence and the logic of neoliberalism will enable us to better 
understand its operation today, and it is hoped that this paper has made a small 
contribution in that direction. 
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